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While outsourcing of production from the U.S. to Mexico has been hailed in Mexico as a valuable
engine of growth, recently there have been misgivings regarding its fickleness and volatility. This
paper is among the first in the trade literature to study the second moment properties of outsourcing.
We begin by documenting a new stylized fact: the maquiladora outsourcing industries in Mexico experience
fluctuations in value added that are roughly twice as volatile as the corresponding industries in the
U.S. A difference-in-difference method is extended to second moments to verify the statistical significance
of this finding. We then develop a stochastic model of outsourcing with heterogeneous firms that can
explain this volatility. The model employs two novel mechanisms: an extensive margin in outsourcing
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I. Introduction 
  Outsourcing, the arrangement whereby firms contract with independent counterparts in 
another country to carry out particular stages of production, has grown over the last fifteen years to 
become an important part of the trade relationship between the U.S. and Mexico.  It is also of 
growing importance for trade between the E.U. and emerging economies in Europe, and in global 
trade with China. In Mexico, employment in outsourcing industries grew ten-fold from 0.12 million 
in 1980 to 1.2 million in 2005.  The sector accounts for just under 3% of Mexico’s total GDP, 20% of 
Mexican manufacturing value added, and nearly half of the country’s exports.  While Mexican 
officials have hailed the export assembly plants that engage in outsourcing for their contribution to 
economic growth , some have also complained that the sector is fickle and subject to excessive 
volatility.
1  The assembly plants, known as maquiladoras, are seen as a channel by which the U.S. 
exports to Mexico a portion of its employment fluctuations over the business cycle.  Despite 
abundant literature on how global outsourcing affects the volume of trade, wage levels, and 
environmental regulation,
2 there is little to no work on the implications of outsourcing for the 
variability of economic activity.
3  This paper aims to help fill this gap.  
  We begin by documenting the variance in outsourcing industries in Mexico. These industries 
are composed of maquiladoras to which U.S. and other foreign firms outsource the assembly of 
inputs into final outputs.  Our data cover Mexico’s four largest outsourcing industries, which together 
account for three quarters of outsourcing production in the country:  apparel, transportation 
                                                 
1 See for example the news account of how the Mexican car industry is highly susceptible to fluctuations in demand 
for American brand automobiles in Dickerson (2005).   
2 See Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1997), and Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2005) for examples and Feenstra and 
Hanson (2003) for a survey of the literature. 
3 Burstein, Kurz, and Tesar (2005) develop a dynamic model of trade in intermediate inputs in which trade flows 
between high-wage and low-wage countries (whose respective outputs are assumed to be complements in 
production) synchronizes business cycles among trading partners.  One difference from our work is that they focus 
on international comovement and correlations, whereas we focus on relative volatilities. A second difference is that 
they model international production as the aggregation of home and foreign intermediate goods that are 
complements, whereas we model international production in terms of outsourcing of variable cost activities over a 
continuum of heterogeneous firms. For other work on in intermediate inputs and business cycle synchronization see 
Kose and Yi (2001) and Ambler, Cardia, and Zimmerman (2002).    2
equipment, electronics, and electrical machinery.  We match these industries to their counterparts in 
the United States.  Our main empirical result is that in all four outsourcing industries the volatility of 
economic activity in Mexico is significantly higher than in the U.S.; averaging over the four 
industries, volatility in Mexico is twice as high as in the U.S.  One conjecture might be that this 
simply reflects higher volatility in the Mexican economy overall.  While aggregate manufacturing in 
Mexico is more volatile than in the U.S., the gap is much less than that found between Mexican 
maquiladora industries and their U.S. counterparts.  In a difference-in-difference regression, adapted 
for second moments, there is a statistically significant difference between Mexican and U.S. 
volatility in outsourcing industries, even after controlling for cross-country differences in aggregate 
manufacturing volatility.  Another conjecture might be that higher volatility in Mexico reflects the 
smaller size of industries in Mexico.  However, our results are robust to comparing Mexican 
industries with the more similarly sized industries of U.S. border states.
4 
  To explain differential volatility in countries engaged in outsourcing, we develop a 
theoretical model of global production sharing that introduces two new mechanisms for generating 
volatility.  The model relies on a continuum of products in the outsourcing sector, and for each 
product an endogenous number of varieties.  This structure combines the Dornbusch-Fisher-
Samuelson (1977) framework with the monopolistic competition model, as also done by Romalis 
(2004).  Production in the outsourcing sector requires two activities:  a fixed-cost activity that takes 
place in the high-wage home country, representing headquarter and managerial costs, and a variable-
cost activity representing assembly work that can be done at home or outsourced to a low-wage 
foreign country.  
                                                 
4 A third conjecture might be that labor-market institutions differ between the countries, such that it is easier to hire 
and fire employees in Mexico.  However, when Botero et al. (2004) rank countries in terms of job security laws 
restricting the hiring and firing of workers, Mexico ties for the most regulated among the 85 countries in the sample, 
whereas the U.S. ranks as the fifth least regulated economy in this respect; these data are used in the analysis of 
volatility and comparative advantage by Cunat and Melitz (2006). We also see this contrast in labor market 
flexibility reflected in our employment data discussed below, in which volatility of employment in overall Mexican 
manufacturing is lower than that for U.S. overall manufacturing.    3
  The first key feature of the model is that the point along the product continuum at which 
firms in the home country begin to outsource the variable-cost activity to firms in the foreign country 
is endogenously determined as firms compare the unit labor costs across borders.
5  When the home 
country experiences a boom in demand, the fact that wages in the country tend to be procyclical 
alters the outsourcing decision of some firms.  If home workers become relatively more expensive to 
hire, firms that previously had not outsourced any production now find it profitable to do so.  This 
shift in the extensive margin acts as a powerful mechanism for the international transmission of 
shocks, whereby U.S. producers shift unusually high levels of production abroad during a domestic 
economic boom, and the reverse during a recession.  Even when the shock is a purely domestic one, 
the simulation shows that it is amplified in its transmission abroad, so that it has a greater impact on 
the outsourcing industries in the low-wage foreign country than on the domestic counterpart 
industries.  Volatility is higher in the foreign country, owing to the fact that firms there specialize 
entirely in the variable-cost activity. 
A second novel feature of the model is the use of preferences obtained from a translog 
expenditure function, which has the convenient property that the elasticity of demand for each 
product variety is proportional to the number of firms in the industry.
6  As a result, markups charged 
by firms are countercyclical, and stochastic increases in demand are not fully absorbed by new 
entrants; rather, increases in demand are split between entry of new firms and increases in firm size.
7  
Because countercyclical markups dampen the entry of new firms, the fixed-cost activity fluctuates 
less than the variable-cost activity.  Through outsourcing, the higher volatility in the variable-cost 
activity translates into higher volatility in production for the low-wage foreign country. 
                                                 
5 This version of outsourcing is similar to the structure used by Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1997), except that we 
also allow firms to enter and exit new varieties of each product. 
6   The translog expenditure function is used by Bergin and Feenstra (2000, 2001), but with a fixed number of 
product varieties.  Feenstra (2003) shows how the reservation prices are solved for when varieties enter and exit, and 
substituting the reservation prices back into the expenditure function yields the functional form used here. 
7 Similar reactions to a change in market size could be obtained from the model of Melitz and Ottaviano (2005), but 
the translog expenditure function has the convenient property that preferences are still homothetic, so that two-stage 
budgeting can be used.    4
  The outsourcing sector is embedded in a two country, general equilibrium trade model, which 
also includes an undifferentiated traded good in each country. Analytical results show how both of 
our new mechanisms affect the relative volatility in the industry wage bill across the two countries in 
the outsourcing sector.  Numerical examples, by way of stochastic simulation under demand and 
supply shocks, indicate that the two mechanisms together can provide a reasonable explanation for 
the extra volatility in Mexican outsourcing.  The results also indicate that among the two new model 
features, it is the endogeneity of the extensive margin in outsourcing that is the more potent in 
accounting for differential volatility in U.S. and Mexican outsourcing industries.  
  The next section presents the data and empirical results.  Section 3 presents the theoretical 
model, and section 4 discusses theoretical results. 
 
II. Data and Empirical Results 
  Outsourcing by the U.S. to Mexico generally takes the form of U.S. firms producing parts and 
components, exporting these intermediate inputs to Mexico to be assembled or processed into final 
goods, and re-importing the finished products.  U.S. firms tend to specialize in R&D, component 
production, marketing, and other headquarters activities, while Mexican plants – the maquiladoras – 
tend to specialize in assembly services.
8  Mexico is among the most important locations for global 
outsourcing by U.S. firms and the U.S. is by far and away Mexico’s largest trading partner.  Over the 
period 2000-2003, the United States was the source country for 73.4% of the inputs imported by 
maquiladoras in Mexico and maquiladora exports back to the United States were equal to 5.3% of 
                                                 
8 The Mexican government measures imports and exports by registered export-assembly plants in Mexico.  Under 
Mexican trade policy, firms that export their output do not have to pay duties on any imported intermediate inputs 
used in production.  To obtain duty-free status, a firm must register with the government.  While under the North 
American Free Trade Agreement imports from the United States are not subject to duties in Mexico, imports from 
most other countries are.  As a result, the vast majority of export-assembly plants in Mexico are registered.  (Strictly 
speaking, export-assembly plants in Mexico may be registered either as maquiladoras or as PITEX (Program for 
Temporary Imports of Articles to be Exported) companies (see http://www.economia.gob.mx/).  Only the former 
appear in our data. In 2003, maquiladora exports to the United States were 2.2 times those by PITEX companies.)    5
U.S. industry shipments (U.S. International Trade Commission, 2005).
9  Maquiladoras have become 
an integral part of the Mexican economy, with their share of national manufacturing employment 
rising from 4.1% in 1980 to 28.3% in 2002 (Hanson, 2006). 
  Most outsourcing by U.S. firms in Mexico occurs in one of four industries:  apparel, electronic 
accessories (including computer parts and electronic circuitry), electrical machinery (including 
televisions and small domestic appliances), and transport equipment and parts (primarily motor 
vehicles).  Figure 1 shows that over 1990 to 2005 these four industries accounted for 72.7% of 
employment in the maquiladora sector.  Several common features of these industries make them 
amenable to global production sharing.  Their production stages—R&D, component production, final 
assembly—tend to be physically separable.  Firms need not perform all tasks in the same location, 
allowing them to allocate stages across countries.  Production stages also vary in their factor 
intensity, with R&D and component production being more skill and capital-intensive and assembly 
being more labor-intensive, giving multinational firms an incentive to locate labor-intensive activities 
in low-wage countries. 
  Mexico first began to allow export assembly plants to operate in the country in the 1960s. The 
maquiladora sector did not reach an appreciable size until the government relaxed restrictions on 
inbound foreign investment in the 1980s.  Initially, U.S. firms outsourcing to Mexico received 
favorable tariff treatment under the HS9802 provision of the U.S. tariff code (Feenstra, Hanson, and 
Swenson, 2000).  Under HS9802, U.S. firms that manufacture components at home and have them 
processed into final goods abroad pay duties on the foreign value-added only when the goods are 
brought back into the United States.  The North American Free Trade Agreement ended special tariff 
                                                 
9 These figures apply to the four core outsourcing industries, described in the text.  Comparing U.S. imports from 
Mexico to U.S. industry output may give a deceptive sense of the size of Mexico’s maquiladora sector relative to 
U.S. manufacturing.  U.S. imports from Mexico include a substantial component of U.S. value added, in the form of 
the intermediate inputs produced in the United States and sent to Mexico for further processing.  As an alternative 
measure of relative size, one might examine value added in the two countries.  Over the period 2000-2003, the ratio 
of value added in Mexico’s maquiladoras to value added in U.S. manufacturing was 0.034 in the four core 
outsourcing industries (based on annual data).    6
treatment for U.S. firms outsourcing to Mexico.  But, as Figure 2 shows, it did not slow growth in 
production sharing.  Growth in real value added by maquiladoras accelerated after NAFTA was 
implemented, increasing by over 100 log points between 1994 and 2005.  Far from removing the 
incentive for Mexico to specialize in assembly services, NAFTA freed resources Mexico had devoted 
to domestic production to move into export assembly. 
Of primary interest to our analysis is the relative variance of output in U.S. manufacturing 
industries and the plants to which they outsource in Mexico.  Ideally, we would like to measure 
output using value added.  However, data constraints require us to use the industry wage bill, instead.  
At the three-digit industry level, monthly data on value added, input purchases, and labor earnings 
(for production and nonproduction workers) are available for maquiladoras in Mexico, but no such 
data are available for the United States.  The only monthly U.S. industry series available are an 
industry production index, which is not directly comparable to value added; the wage bill for 
production workers, which is a substantial component of value added; employment of production 
workers; and total employment.
10  We compare the monthly variation in the production-worker wage 
bill in the two countries at the industry level.  We match Mexico’s four primary outsourcing 
industries (assembly of apparel items, electronic materials and accessories, assembly of electrical 
machinery and equipment, and construction and assembly of transport equipment and parts) with 
their closest U.S. three-digit industry matches (apparel manufacturing, NAICS 315; computer and 
electronic product manufacturing, NAICS 334; electrical equipment, appliance, and component 
manufacturing, NAICS 335; and transportation equipment manufacturing, NAICS 336).  Data are 
available from 1993 forward.
11  However, in late 1994 there was a large depreciation of the peso, as 
capital fled Mexico, and in 1995 output dropped sharply.  Given the exposure of the maquiladora 
                                                 
10 In U.S. manufacturing, the production-worker wage bill accounts for 27.8% of value added; in Mexico’s 
maquiladora sector, the comparable figure is 19.0%.   
11 Data for Mexico’s maquiladora industries go back to 1990.  However, data on Mexico’s overall manufacturing 
sector is only available from 1993 forward, owing to a change in the construction of the series in that year.    7
sector to exchange-rate fluctuations, including the peso-crisis years in our sample could make 
volatility in Mexico’s outsourcing industries seem artificially high.  To avoid this problem, we limit 
the analysis to the period 1996-2005. 
To provide a visual sense of the relative variation in industry activity in the two countries, 
Figure 3 plots the production-worker wage bill for the four core outsourcing industries over the 
sample period.  Each series is in log terms, deflated by the national CPI.  To remove seasonal 
fluctuations and time trends, each series is seasonally adjusted and HP filtered.  In each industry, 
economic activity in Mexico is substantially more volatile than in the United States.  Table 1A, 
which shows the ratio of the standard deviations for the wage bill in Mexican and U.S. industries, 
reinforces this perception.  In each industry, the standard deviation of Mexican earnings is greater 
than in the United States, with the Mexico-U.S. ratio averaging 2.03 over the four industries. 
Of course, Mexican industries may be more volatile than their U.S. counterparts simply 
because at an aggregate level the Mexican economy is more volatile than the U.S. economy.  To 
control for such differences in aggregate volatility, Table 1A also shows the relative standard 
deviation in the industry wage bill in the two countries divided by the relative standard deviation for 
the production-worker wage bill for all manufacturing industries.  While overall manufacturing 
earnings in Mexico are more volatile than in the U.S., the relative volatility of Mexico’s maquiladora 
industries is even greater.   The Mexico-U.S. standard-deviation ratio, divided by the aggregate 
manufacturing standard-deviation ratio, averages 1.3 over the four outsourcing industries. 
For robustness, Table 1B reports the same standard deviations and ratios for production worker 
employment rather than the wage bill. The contrast in outsourcing volatility stands out even more 
clearly here. This is mainly due to the fact that volatility in overall manufacturing employment in 
Mexico is low relative to the U.S. This may reflect the finding in Botero et al. (2004) that Mexico has 
more restrictive laws regarding employment security (see note 4).    8
Another concern is that the size of the two economies may affect their estimated relative 
volatilities.  If a Mexican manufacturing industry is small and its U.S. counterpart is large, the 
variance in the Mexico industry wage bill may be larger than for the U.S. simply because summing 
over a larger number of plants in the United States tends to smooth out shocks that are idiosyncratic 
to plants.  Table 2 reports production worker employment in each industry, showing that in two of 
the four industries the U.S. is indeed much larger.  One option to deal with potential size disparities 
would be to use more narrowly defined industry categories in the U.S.  But if we were to move to 
four-digit classifications, the composition of goods in the U.S. and Mexican industries would differ, 
making it difficult to draw reasonable comparisons.
12  An alternative way of dealing with potential 
size disparities is to reduce the geographic coverage of the U.S. series.  The vast majority of 
maquiladoras in Mexico are located in Mexican border cities and many are linked to production 
operations on the U.S. side of the border (Feenstra, Hanson, and Swenson, 2000).  This makes U.S. 
border states a natural geographic unit to which to compare Mexican outsourcing industries.  In 
Table 3, we compare Mexican industries to their counterparts in California and Texas, which are the 
two U.S. border states for which industry data are available.
13 At the state level, the only series 
available for three-digit industries is total employment.  Table 2 shows that employment in 
outsourcing industries in California and Texas is similar in scale to Mexican industries. Table 3 
shows that that standard deviations and their ratios based on state employment data are very similar 
to those obtained for national data.  
  To examine in a more formal manner the relative volatility of Mexican and U.S. outsourcing 
industries, we test whether the variability of the industry wage bill differs between the two countries, 
controlling for aggregate differences in volatility.  Let  ict Y  be the wage bill for production workers in 
                                                 
12 In unreported results, we examined relative volatilities in Mexican industries and their corresponding U.S. four-
digit industries.  The results are qualitatively very similar to those reported in Tables 1, 3 and 4. 
13 The small number of plants in three-digit manufacturing industries in Arizona and New Mexico makes industry-
level data for these states to disclosure restrictions.    9
industry i, country c (c=Mexico, United States), and time t.  An industry may be one of the four 
outsourcing industries, in which case i=o, or the aggregate across all manufacturing industries (and 
not just outsourcing industries), in which case i=m.  A standard measure of industry variability is the 
squared deviation from the mean, 2 () ict ic YY − , where  ic Y is the mean value of the wage bill in 
industry i and country c over the sample period.   
  For each of the four outsourcing industries, we pool observations on  2 () ict ic YY − across 
countries  
and time.  Then, we add to this sample pooled observations on  2 () ict ic YY − in aggregate 
manufacturing in the two countries, yielding a data set with 2*2*T observations, where T is the 
number of months in the sample period.  Using these data, we estimate the following regression for 
each combination of an outsourcing industry with aggregate manufacturing: 
 
       2
01 2 3 () 1 [ ] 1 [ ] 1 [ ] 1 [ ] −= += + =+==+ ict ic ict YY i o c M X i o c M X β ββ β ε   
 
where 1[i=o] equals one if industry i is an outsourcing industry and zero if industry i is a 
manufacturing aggregate, 1[c=MX] equals one if country c is Mexico and zero if country c is the 
United States, and εict is a disturbance term we discuss below.   
  The regression equation is a difference-in-difference estimator of the variability of industry 
activity.  The coefficient β3 identifies the difference in the variability of the wage bill specific to 
outsourcing industries in Mexico, controlling for aggregate differences in variability between Mexico 
and the United States (captured by the main effect on the Mexico dummy, β2) and differences in 
variability between outsourcing industry o and aggregate manufacturing (captured by the main effect 
on the outsourcing industry dummy, β1).  Given the regressand is the square of a variable, the error 
term is likely to have a non-spherical distribution, complicating inference on the regression    10
parameters.  We use bootstrap methods to obtain standard errors for the coefficient estimates.  By 
estimating the regression for each outsourcing industry separately, we allow Mexico-U.S. relative 
volatility to vary across industries.  The sample period for the analysis is 1996:1-2005:12. 
    In Table 4A, we see that the variability of the wage bill in Mexico’s outsourcing industries is 
higher than in corresponding U.S. industries, even after controlling for the binational difference in 
variability for aggregate manufacturing.  For all four industries, the difference in relative variability 
is very precisely estimated.  Not surprisingly, variability in the wage bill is higher for outsourcing 
industries than for aggregate manufacturing (as shown by the positive and significant main effect on 
the outsourcing industry dummy) and higher for Mexico than for the United States (as shown by the 
positive main effect on the Mexico dummy). Table 4B shows that the results are essentially the same 
when the methodology is applied to state-level employment data. For all industries and cases tested, 
the interaction term is positive and strongly statistically significant.  These results indicate that 
economic activity in industries engaging in high levels of outsourcing is higher in the country 
specializing in labor-intensive product assembly (Mexico) than in the country specializing in skill-
intensive headquarters operations and component production (the U.S.). 
 
III. Theoretical Model 
A. Pricing and Product Variety in the Outsourcing Sector 
Consider a model of two countries, labeled home and foreign. The outsourcing relationship in 
this model is characterized by the home country outsourcing to the foreign country, so that home may 
be thought of as representing the U.S. and foreign represents Mexico. We will scale the quantity 
variables coming from the foreign country by its relative size:  if the share n of the world population 
resides in the home country and 1-n in the foreign country, then we scale foreign quantities by (1-
n)/n. Foreign variables will be denoted by an asterisk *.    11
  Each country has two sectors. The first is a standard nondifferentiated good whose 
production is specific to that country; this will be subscripted by H for the home country’s 
domestically produced good, and F for the foreign good. The second sector consists of differentiated 
products that are multinational, subscripted by M, in that they can be produced using factors in either 
country. This sector represents the aggregate of the four industries listed in the empirical section 
above, and it sometimes will be referred to as the outsourcing sector. There is a continuum of 
products in this sector indexed by  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ z , and for each z, there is free entry of firms who then 
produce N(z) differentiated varieties of input z.  The model follows Romalis (2004) in combining a 
continuum of products z in the M sector along with multiple varieties N(z) of each product. 
The main contribution of the model is to propose a theoretical description of outsourcing that 
can broadly replicate the empirical results described above. Production in the outsourcing sector 
involves a fixed cost activity as well as a variable cost activity. The fixed cost, B, represents 
headquarters and R&D services. It is assumed here to be uniform across goods and takes place in the 
home country, due to the assumption that it is sufficiently more productive in these activities. The 
variable cost activity has a unit labor cost that differs by variety, and follows the decreasing 
distribution  ( ) ( ) exp Mt t az a z b =+  in the source country. The foreign country has a corresponding 
distribution, and the relative unit cost function between the two countries will be specified:  
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Overall demand for this sector in the home country is specified as    12
∫ =
1
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where  ) (z dM  is the aggregated demand for a variety z. This in turn is equated to 
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where  ) (z Nt  is the number of firms in the industry,  ) (z pt  is the price (equal across product 
varieties), and  ) (z yt  the level of production in each firm. Under our assumptions that the fixed cost 
and weight in demand are both are uniform across varieties, then the number of entrants likewise is 
uniform across varieties, so Nt does not vary with z. We choose the multinational good DMt as the 
numeraire.  
  The number of entrants depends on the market structure assumed for each variety. If we were 
to make the usual assumption of a CES specification of preferences over entrants within a variety 
with elasticity σ , the number of entrants will be 
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That is, the number of entrants in the CES specification is directly proportional to demand. This is a 
well-known result in the CES case, but works against finding any difference in the employment 
volatility in our model between the home and foreign countries. Even though all the fixed-cost 
activities take place at home, those activities are not any less volatile than the variable cost activities 
when entry is proportional to demand, as in (3).  
  Instead, we will focus on a case where preferences over varieties that are not CES. A 
particularly useful and tractable specification for preferences in this case are those that follow a 
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where  ) (z pit  is the price of variety i of product z, and where 
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  Notice that the parameters in this translog function vary with the number of products. Feenstra 
(2003) shows that this specification arises by starting with a symmetric translog function with fixed 
parameters, and then solving for the reservation price for varieties not available. Substituting these 
reservation prices back into the translog function, we obtain the specification above. In this 
specification the elasticity of demand is time varying, but with the added parameter restriction that γ 
= 1, then the demand elasticity very conveniently equals the number of entrants. As shown in the 
Appendix, the number of entrants then follows a “square root formula”: 
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So the translog case naturally gives rise to a dampened response of new varieties to demand shocks, 
which will generate less volatility in the fixed-cost activities (done at home) as compared to the 
variable cost activities (done in both countries). When examining the translog case we shall keep the 
outsourcing margin  't z  fixed for convenience. Our interest, then, will be in comparing the volatility 
in employment generated by dampened entry (6) in the translog case, to the volatility in employment 
generated by endogenous outsourcing margin (1) in the CES case.    14
  The overall labor demand in the multinational sector in each country,  Mt L  and 
*
Mt L , also 
depends on the particular market structure within varieties. Labor demand at home includes labor 
used for the fixed cost activity as well as the variable cost activity for varieties not outsourced 
( ' tt z z > ); labor demand abroad includes just variable cost activity for outsourced varieties ( ' tt z z < ). 
For CES preferences: 
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For translog preferences: 
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B. Production in the Rest of the Economy 
The remainder of the model follows a standard open macroeconomy specification. The 
country-specific sector in the home country is a perfectly competitive market for an undifferentiated 
traded good with production function 







= , (9)    15
where  Ht L  is labor in the home country-specific sector and  Ht a  is labor cost. Profit maximization by 
producers in this sector implies 
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The representative household in each country has additively separable preferences over 
consumption ( t C ), which is a composite of goods in the three sectors, and overall labor ( t L ).  We 
assume complete asset markets in state-contingent securities between countries. The household 
optimization problem in the source country may be expressed: 
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and where  t X  is the holdings of Arrow-Debreu securities that pay off in units of the numeraire 
multinational good in state s. Likewise for the foreign country. 
Labor is mobile between sectors within a country, and between fixed and variable cost 
activities within the home outsourcing sector, but there is no labor mobility between countries. So 
each country has a single but distinct equilibrium wage rate.  
Complete asset markets implies the following risk-sharing condition equating the marginal 
utilities of consumption up to a constant of proportionality    16






φ ω = , (11) 
where ω is a constant indicating the relative per-capita wealth of the home country in the initial asset 
allocation.  Relative demand for the home and foreign local goods follow: 
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Note that the law of one price holds here, so the relative prices  Ht P  and  Ft P  apply to the goods 
markets in both countries. And labor supply is 










=− . (14) 
Corresponding conditions apply for the foreign country. 
An exogenous component of demand will be denoted t G . This term is introduced to capture 
exogenous changes in demand arising from several sources, including shifts in government purchases 
and shifts in investment demand. The exogenous demand is allocated among the three goods in the 
same way as private consumption, according to demand conditions like (12 and 13) above.  We 
denote total demands as the sum of consumption and government demand:  ttt D CG =+, 
Mt Mt Mt D CG =+, etc. 
 
D. Market Clearing and Equilibrium 
The market clearing condition for domestic good in the home country is 
  
** 11Ht
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. (15)    17
Market clearing in the labor market requires that overall labor supply equal the sum of labor 
demands in the sectors 
   tH tM t L LL =+   (16) 
  
** *
tF tM t L LL =+ 
Equilibrium here is a sequence of 19 endogenous variables: 
* , tt L L , 
* , Ht Ft L L , 
* , Mt Mt L L , 
* , tt WW, 
* , tt NN , 
* , Ht Ht CC , 
* , FtF t CC
* , Mt Mt CC ,  , Ht Ft p p , and  't z , which are determined by the labor-supply 
condition (14), relative demand for the home country-specific good (12), that for the foreign country-
specific good (13), optimal entry condition (3 or 4), labor demand for the country-specific sector 
(10), and the multinational sector (7 or 8), market clearing condition for the country-specific sector 
(15), labor (16), and foreign counterparts for each of these. In addition there is the marginal 
outsourcing condition (1), the risk sharing condition in (11). The price of the numeraire good DMt is 
set to unity (as described in the Appendix).  
Finally, value added in each sector (in units of the multinational goods numeraire) can then be 
computed as 
  ** * ** * * ** *
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,,
t t t Mt t Mt Ht Ht t Ht
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The model will include shocks both to demand and supply, entering through the additive 
demand term (
*  and  tt GG ) and the unit labor cost terms (
* and  Ht Ft aa ). Both types of shocks are 
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IV. Model Results: 
A. Analytical result 
This section demonstrates that the model can broadly generate the primary empirical result in 
section 2, which is amplified volatility in the outsourcing sector of the destination country.  It then 
analyzes the model features most important for this result. 
Some useful intuition into the relative volatility across countries in this sector can be gained by 
taking the ratio of the labor demand conditions (7a,b) in the CES case, each multiplied by its 
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Note that if the outsourcing margin were to taken to be taken to be a constant, then this ratio is would 
also be a constant, and value added across countries are directly proportional to each other. In other 
words, the percentage volatility of earnings in the outsourcing sectors in the two countries are 
necessarily equal to each other. 
This may seem surprising, since the U.S. engages a portion of its labor in this sector in a fixed 
cost activity, which by definition does not vary when a firm raises its level of production. However, 
the free entry condition (3) indicates that the number of firms producing each variety rises in direct 
proportion with demand in the CES case, so that the expenditure on the fixed cost rises likewise in 
proportion.  In essence, the market accommodates the rise in demand by replicating firms without    19
any increase in average firm size. Labor demand for the fixed cost activity rises in proportion to labor 
demand for the variable cost activity in this case, so the fixed/variable distinction has no bearing on 
the volatility of value added across the two countries.   
There are two readily apparent ways to break this tight linkage. First, we can allow the 
outsourcing margin to be endogenous, so that the term z’ in equation (18) above varies, thus implying 
the ratio of income on the left side of that equation also to vary over time. For example, consider a 
rise in overall demand in the source country. If this drives up relative wages in the source country, it 
will induce some firms previously near the margin to begin outsourcing. This direct shift in 
employment for variable cost activities from one country to the other will reduce the impact of the 
demand shock on employment and labor earnings in the source country, and act as a mechanism to 
transfer some of the impact of the demand shock to the foreign outsourcing sector. Depending on 
how sensitive firms are in the outsourcing sector of the U.S. to relative wage changes, and depending 
on the prevalence of U.S. demand shocks, this is a potential mechanism for reducing volatility in the 
U.S. outsourcing sector and raising it in the corresponding sector in Mexico. In other words, even if 
Mexico has restrictions on the ability of firms to fire and hire workers, if U.S. firms are able to enter 
and exit outsourcing relationships with Mexican firms, this becomes a mechanism by which U.S. 
firms can shunt temporary excess demand off on foreign production facilities, and vice versa during 
temporary shortfalls in demand.  
It is more ambiguous how this mechanism would play out in the case of productivity shocks. If 
an overall rise in productivity in a country, including the outsourcing sector, leads to a rise in wages 
of a similar amount, there then would be no change in the cross-country ratio of relative unit labor 
costs and relative wages, and hence no movement of the extensive margin of outsourcing.  Any 
movement along this margin would rely upon relative wages moving less or more than the rise in 
productivity in the outsourcing sector.    20
The second approach used in the paper for breaking the link between countries in the 
outsourcing sector is to introduce sluggishness in the entry of new firms, thus preventing the fixed 
cost activity in the source country from mimicking volatility in the variable cost activity abroad. As 
discussed above, introducing translog preferences in the model is one way to implement this feature. 
When a rise in demand encourages new entry, the resulting rise in substitution elasticity and resulting 
fall in markups lowers profits, thereby discouraging entry. As a result, aggregate earnings by workers 
in the fixed-cost activity of the outsourcing sector in the source country varies less in response to 
fluctuations in demand than does the variable cost activity. 
 
B. Calibration of Numerical Experiment 
  A numerical experiment is helpful for evaluating the ability of the model with translog 
preferences and endogenous outsourcing to generate volatility in the outsourcing sector.  
The parameters characterizing production in the outsourcing sector can be calibrated in part by 
using our available data. Regarding the U.S. cost distribution in the outsourcing sector ( () Mt az ), we 
first set the value at the steady state margin equal to the value for the overall manufacturing sector 
(that is, set  ( ) ( ) exp Mt az a z b ≡+ = Ht a ). Secondly, Bernard et al. (2003) report that the standard 
deviation of log U.S. plant sales is 1.67.  Together, these facts are sufficient to pin down the values of 
the two parameters in the outsourcing distribution parameters.
14 Comparing the level of employment 
in our data set for the four outsourcing industries in Mexico and in the U.S., Mexican employment 
represents 20% of the total over both countries. This is used to calibrate the steady state outsourcing 
share:  z =0.20 
                                                 
14  In particular, given that distribution is over the unit interval, the constant value a can be computed as 
0.5 1.67(1/12) /σ
− , and  t b  varies with overall productivity shocks   log( ) tH t ba a z = − .    21
Regarding the distribution of relative unit costs between the two countries, 
() ( ) exp td t d t Az az b =+ , the lack of cross-sectional data for Mexican plants hampers calibration. As 
with the U.S. distribution above, two pieces of information are needed to pin down the two 
parameters,   and  dd ab . First, if one computes the average weekly rate of payment to workers for the 
four outsourcing industries in our data set, workers in the U.S. sector are paid 8 times as much as the 
Mexican workers.  To make the relative unit cost distribution consistent with this fact in steady state, 
it requires that  ( ) Az=1/8, which is sufficient to solve for the steady state value of 
() log 0.125 dd ba z =− .  Unfortunately we have no information on the standard deviation of the 
relative unit cost distribution analogous to that used above to pin down the second parameter in the 
U.S. cost distribution. Of special significance for the endogenous outsourcing mechanism is the slope 
of the distribution at the steady state margin of outsourcing,  ( ) ' Az . The flatter the distribution at this 
point, the stronger will be the adjustment in the outsourcing margin for a given relative wage change. 
To gauge the potential impact of the outsourcing margin, we begin by calibrating this slope to be 
near zero, implying that the relative unit cost of firms in Mexico to that in the U.S. changes little in 
the neighborhood of the steady state. Simulations will investigate the sensitivity of results for a range 
of alternative calibrations for this value. Note that the relative unit cost distribution parameters are 
not time-varying, so the distribution does not shift in response to productivity shocks in either 
country. This specification implies that productivity shocks in one country are transmitted fully to 
foreign affiliates, so that the ratio of the unit costs across countries remains stable.
15   
                                                 
15 An alternative assumption would be to shift the A(z) distribution in proportion to productivity shocks in either 
country. In experiments, this was found to imply a strongly negative correlation in the output levels of the 
outsourcing sectors across countries, which is counterfactual. The assumption that productivity shocks are 
transmitted fully to foreign affiliates is very similar to that assumed in Burstein, et al (2005), also used to generate 
positive cross-country correlations in a model of multi-national production.      22
The size of the fixed cost of entry in the outsourcing sector (B) is calibrated so that in steady 
state each industry in the outsourcing sector has six firms that choose to enter ( N =6); this requires 
B=0.0087. This facilitates comparison between the translog and CES versions of the model, since the 
number of entrants will be the elasticity of substitution between goods, which was calibrated for the 
CES case above at 6. 
Regarding preference parameters, calibrations for the most standard of these are taken from the 
business cycle literature. The elasticity of substitution between varieties is set to imply a price 
markup of 20% (so σ =6). The labor supply elasticity is set at unity, μ =1. The curvature parameter 
is set at φ =2. The elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is calibrated at the 
common value of unity (η =1). Since the multinational good can be produced either as a home or as 
a foreign good, we assume that it has double this elasticity ( χ =2). 
The remaining preference parameters are calibrated to reflect the relationship between the U.S. 
and Mexico in the last year of our data set, 2003. The home bias parameters as set to reflect the share 
of import expenditures in GDP, θ =0.88, 
* θ =0.71. The four U.S. industries classified as outsourcing 
industries in the data set represent 24% of total U.S. manufacturing, so the outsourcing share 
parameter is calibrated as  0.24 α = . The relative weight on the home country in the complete asset 
market allocation (ϖ ) is calibrated so that the model generates in steady state a ratio of home 
consumption to foreign consumption that is close to ratio of real consumption levels per capita in the 
data, which is 6.27 (requiring 1/ϖ =37). The steady state level of the additive demand term (G  and 
* G ) is calibrated to represent government spending, and since our model abstracts from the 
investment component of demand, the steady state value is set to equal the share of government 
purchases in GDP net of investment spending, which is 22% in US data. The U.S. population 
represents 74 percent of the total population of the two countries combined, so n = 0.74.    23
  Productivity shock parameters are estimated from a first-order autoregression on Solow 
residuals computed from our data set on earnings and employment in overall manufacturing in each 
country.
16 Using HP filtered monthly data, the estimated coefficients are shown in Table 5. 
Regarding demand shocks, there is no monthly series available for government consumption, so we 
use total government spending from IFS. Again the parameter values from the autoregression are 
listed in Table 5.  
 
C. Numerical Results 
Simulations consist of solving the model numerically in its original nonlinear form for 120 
periods of random draws of shocks. The first 20 periods are dropped, and the remaining 100 periods 
are HP filtered and deflated by the CPI, just as were the data reported in Table 3, and used to 
compute moments. This process is repeated 1000 times, and we report the average of moments over 
the replications.  
Table 6 reports results for the benchmark model. As a precondition for studying the 
transmission to the outsourcing sector, the combination of demand and supply shocks does a 
reasonably good job of replicating the degree of volatility in the overall level of income in the US 
and Mexican economies, though the U.S. overall manufacturing volatility is overstated somewhat in 
the simulation.  Of primary interest is the fact that the calibrated model does a remarkably good job 
of replicating the relative amplification of volatility in the outsourcing sectors of the two countries. 
While the data imply that outsourcing income is twice as volatile in Mexico as in the U.S., the model 
can explain why it is 78% more volatile. Further, the correlations are all positive in the simulation, as 
in the data. In fact, the outsourcing model implies a very strong positive correlation in the income of 
                                                 
16 Following Glick and Rogoff, we compute Solow residuals setting the labor share at 0.6 and assuming a 
constant capital stock. Resulting parameter estimates are almost identical if we follow the production 
function in the theoretical model and assume a labor share of unity.    24
the outsourcing sector and overall economies of the two countries.
17 The subsequent columns of the 
table indicate that the US demand shocks and Mexican supply shocks are the primary drivers of these 
moments. 
Table 7 investigates the sensitivity of the results to the calibration of the relative cost 
distribution,  ( ) Az. Clearly a flat distribution in the neighborhood of the steady state amplifies the 
relative volatility in the outsourcing sector. The ability of the model to generate amplified volatility 
in the Mexican outsourcing sector drops off as the slope is assumed to be steeper, but a range of 
assumptions for this slope still generates substantial amplification.  
Next we investigate the relative contributions of the two key model features, endogenous 
outsourcing and translog preferences. Table 8 shows that when the outsourcing margin is held fixed, 
the translog preferences on their own generate significantly less amplification, albeit still a positive 
amount. The potency of translog preferences to make Mexican volatility more volatile than in the 
U.S. is limited by the size of the fixed cost activity in the U.S. The fixed cost parameter, B, is 
calibrated to imply an endogenous elasticity of substitution of 6; in the present model, this calibration 
limits the size of the fixed cost activity to approximately 10% of employment in the U.S. outsourcing 
sector.  When translog preferences are replaces with CES, the endogenous outsourcing  mechanism 
on its own generates only slightly less volatility in the Mexican outsourcing mechanism than in the 
benchmark case. When both translog preferences and endogenous outsourcing are shut down, 
volatility in the outsourcing sector is strongly reduced.
18  
Next, we consider a case to address the concern that translog preferences might not dampen 
firm creation sufficiently to be realistic. For example, the theory does not attempt to model the 
                                                 
17 The strong positive correlations are a point of interest, given that related work by Burstein et al (2005) found this 
fact challenging to replicate in theoretical simulations. Experiments to follow will study why this result arises here. 
18 The fact there is any extra volatility in Mexican outsourcing relative to the U.S. in this case is due entirely to 
relative movements in the CPIs used to deflate the variables before computing moments. Simulation results confirm 
the theoretical prediction earlier in the paper, that when income is reported in units of goods and not deflated to 
consumption units, the ratio of standard deviation in Mexican outsourcing to that in the U.S. is precisely unity.     25
complex dynamics of firm entry, in which it is reasonable to think there are substantial delay between 
a decision to enter and actually commencing production. Nor does the theory model the sunk cost of 
entry, which might discourage entry in response to transitory shocks. We test whether the modeling 
of this feature of the economy could be quantitatively relevant for the issue at hand, by modeling it in 
its most extreme form. Column 6 of Table 8 reports simulation results for the case where no new 
firms are able to enter. The results show that precluding entry only raises by a small amount the ratio 
of outsourcing volatility in Mexico compared to the U.S. Since modeling the most extreme form of 
sluggishness in firm entry has a quantitatively small impact on the results, it would seem that 
modeling the intermediate cast of realistic entry dynamics, requiring an entirely new model solution 
methodology, is not warranted.  
Lastly, we consider the impacts of outsourcing on the overall transmission of business cycle 
shocks. This issue is not the primary focus of the present paper, but since the simulations do have 
implications for this important question, we summarize these here. Burstein et al. (2005) notes that 
the output correlations are higher across countries that engage in internationalized production like 
outsourcing. Our model of outsourcing appears to imply such a result. The cross-country correlation 
in overall income is a very high value of 0.91 in the benchmark case. This result is partly due to the 
presence of endogenous outsourcing. Even though the international correlation in the outsourcing 
sector itself is somewhat lower than this value for the overall economy, the fact that the two countries 
are linked by the endogenous outsourcing condition acts as a potent mechanism linking wages and 
hence labor earnings across economies. It is a well-know feature in many trade models that a 
homogeneous good produced in all countries fixes the relative wage between countries. In our model 
of endogenous outsourcing, the relative wage is not completely fixed, but its movements are limited 
by the ability of the outsourcing margin to move along the relative unit cost distribution. This 
hypothesis is tested by simulating a version of the model where the outsourcing sector is removed 
(a=0, and the outsourcing margin made exogenous). The output correlation in this case falls to 0.72.    26
The rest of the high international correlation is due to the presence of demand shocks, which fall on 
both home and foreign goods as specified by the calibrated degree of home bias. When the supply 
shocks as well as the outsourcing sector both are removed, the overall income correlation falls to 
0.16. There appears to be an interaction between these two model features, since when the 
benchmark outsourcing model is limited to demand shocks, the overall output correlation remains at 
a higher value of 0.60. These results clearly are just suggestive, and for a more thorough examination 
of the overall propagation properties of outsourcing we would recommend a more general model that 
includes investment dynamics in real capital. This is left to future research. 
 
V. Conclusion 
This paper has studied the second-moment properties of global outsourcing. It has documented 
a new empirical regularity:  outsourcing industries in Mexico experience fluctuations in economic 
activity that are twice as volatile as the corresponding industries in the U.S. A difference-in-
difference method adapted to second moments is used to verify the finding is statistically significant 
and is specific to the outsourcing sector. The paper then developed a new theoretical model of 
outsourcing which can explain this stylized fact. The model features heterogeneous firms that are free 
to enter and exit outsourcing relationships, and where the degree of entry of new firms into 
production is modulated by a novel modeling of countercyclical markups. Stochastic simulations 
show that modeling the extensive margin response of outsourcing to shocks is key for explaining the 
empirical regularity. 
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Appendix 
  In addition the nondifferentiated goods from each country, consumers purchase the 
continuum of products in the multinational sectors indexed by z. For each z, there are Nt(z) products 
and the unit-expenditure function from consumers is given by (4)-(5). Differentiating this unit-
expenditure function with respect to ln pit(z), we obtain the share sit(z) of variety i in the expenditure 
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When prices are equal across varieties in a symmetric equilibrium, ln pit(z) = ln pt(z), then the shares 
of varieties are also equal, sit(z) = 1/Nt (z). So making use of (5) we rewrite (A2) as: 
]. 1 ) ( [ 1 ) ( − + = z N z t it γ η      ( A 3 )    
With the added parameter restriction that γ = 1, then we see that  ) ( ) ( z N z t it = η , so the elasticity of 
demand equals the number of firms in the symmetric equilibrium. 
  To determine the number of firms we make use of zero profits for each product z.  Fixed 
costs for each product variety are BWt.  Since the price of the multinational good is taken as 
numeraire, then the revenue earned from home plus foreign sales of each variety is 
] / ) 1 ( )[ ( ) ( ) (
* n n D D z s z d z p Mt Mt it it it − + = . In the symmetric equilibrium this equals 
) ( / ] / ) 1 ( [
* z N n n D D t Mt Mt − + . To obtain profits, equal to revenue minus variable costs, we divide by 
the elasticity of demand. So in the CES case we divide revenue by σ, thereby obtaining profits 
)]. ( /[ ] / ) 1 ( [
* z N n n D D t Mt Mt σ − +  Setting this equal to fixed costs BWt, we solve for the number of 
products in (3), which is equal for all z. Alternatively, in the translog case the elasticity is    30
) ( ) ( z N z t it = η , and dividing revenue by this we obtain 
2 * ) ( / ] / ) 1 ( [ z N n n D D t Mt Mt − + . Setting this 
equal to fixed costs BWt, we solve for the number of products in (6), which is again equal for all z. 
    Labor demand at home is obtained by integrating over the fixed costs B for every product 
] 1 , 0 [ ∈ z , and the variable labor costs  ( ) ) (z y z a t Mt  for those products  ] 1 , ' [ t z z∈ : 
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The number of varieties Nt appearing in the first integral of (A4) is obtained from (3) or (6). For the 
second integral, we multiply the labor costs  ) (z ayt by the wage Wt, and further multiply by the 
markup ) 1 /( − σ σ  in the CES case, to obtain the expenditure  t Mt Mt N n n D D / ] / ) 1 ( [
* − +  on each 
variety. So the expression inside the second integral of (A4) equals  t Mt Mt W n n D D σ σ / ) 1 ]( / ) 1 ( [
* − − + , 
which is integrated over ] 1 , [
'
t z z∈  and summed with the first integral to yield (7a). In the translog case 
the logic is similar, except that the markup of price over marginal costs is  ) 1 /( ) 1 /( − = − t t t t N N η η , 
and Nt is obtained from (6). Evaluating the integrals in (A4) we obtain (8a). 
  For foreign labor demand we integrate the variable labor costs  ( ) ) (
* * z y z a t Mt  for  ] , 0 [
'
t z z∈ : 
   () ∫ =
'
0
* * * ) (
t z
t t Mt t dz N z y z a L . (A5) 
Multiplying the labor costs  ) (
* * z y a t by the wage 
*
t W , and further multiplying by the markup 
) 1 /( − σ σ  in the CES case, we again obtain the expenditure  t Mt Mt N n n D D / ] / ) 1 ( [
* − +  on each 
variety.  So the expression inside the integral of (A5) equals 
* * / ) 1 ]( / ) 1 ( [ t Mt Mt W n n D D σ σ − − + , which 
is integrated over ] ' , 0 [ t z z∈  to yield (7b). Again, in the translog case the markup of price over 
marginal costs is instead  ) 1 /( ) 1 /( − = − t t t t N N η η , and evaluating the integral in (A5) we obtain (8b).    31
  Finally, we need to derive the price index for the numeraire good DMt, and set this equal to 
unity.  
It can be shown that in the CES case the price index is:   
      () ()()
*
2 * *
,, ln ' ln 1 ' ln ln ' '
12 2
MC E St t t t t t t t t t
aa a
P zW z W z bb z b
σ
σ
⎛⎞ − ⎛⎞ =+ −+ + + − + + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
, (A6) 
and alternatively in the translog case: 
      () ()()
*
2 * *
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12 2
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N
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. (A7) 
Both of these expressions are set equal to unity in the simulations to close the model. 
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Table 1A.  Relative Volatility in Mexico and U.S. Outsourcing Industries: 
Production Worker Wage Bill 
 
   Apparel 
Electrical 
Machinery  Electronics 
Transport 
Equipment  Average 
Standard Deviations          
*
i (Y ) σ   (Mex. Outsourcing Industry)  4.83 4.41  6.21  4.20  4.91 
i (Y ) σ   (U.S. Outsourcing Industry)  2.31 2.01  2.79  2.63  2.44 
* (Y ) σ  (Mex. Aggregate Manufacturing)  1.94 1.94  1.94  1.94  1.94 
(Y) σ    (U.S. Aggregate Manufacturing)  1.27 1.27  1.27  1.27  1.27 
*
ii (Y )/ (Y ) σσ   2.09 2.19  2.23  1.60  2.03 








  1.37 1.44  1.46  1.05  1.33 
Correlations         
*
ii (Y ,Y ) corr    0.24  0.29    0.51  0.41  0.36 
* (Y ,Y ) corr   0.24  0.24  0.24  0.24  0.24 
**
i (Y ,Y ) corr   0.33 0.48  0.47  0.15  0.36 
i (Y ,Y) corr   0.52 0.75  0.57  0.63  0.62 
 
Notes:   
 
The top half of the table shows standard deviations (in percent) for the production-worker wage bill in 
specific Mexico and U.S. outsourcing industries, and in Mexico and U.S. aggregate manufacturing, and 
the ratios of these standard deviations.  Each series is in log real values (deflated by the national CPI), 
seasonally adjusted, and HP filtered.  Data are monthly from 1996 through 2005. 
The bottom half of the table shows correlations between the wage-bill series, and between the wage bill 
and average hourly wage in manufacturing.  Each series is in log real values (deflated by the national 
CPI), seasonally adjusted, and HP filtered.  Data are monthly from 1996 through 2005. 
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Table 1B.  Relative Volatility in Mexico and U.S. Outsourcing Industries: 
Production Worker Employment 
   Apparel 
Electrical 
Machinery  Electronics 
Transport 
Equipment  Average 
Standard Deviations          
*
i (Y ) σ   (Mex. Outsourcing Industry)  4.52 4.34  5.95  2.96  4.44 
i (Y ) σ   (U.S. Outsourcing Industry)  1.89 1.79  3.06  1.42  2.04 
* (Y ) σ  (Mex. Aggregate Manufacturing)  0.89 0.89  0.89  0.89  0.89 
(Y) σ    (U.S. Aggregate Manufacturing)  1.15 1.15  1.15  1.15  1.15 
*
ii (Y )/ (Y ) σσ   2.39 2.42  1.94  2.08  2.21 








  3.09 3.13  2.51  2.69  2.86 
Correlations         
*
ii (Y ,Y ) corr    0.49  0.43   0.66  0.45  0.51 
* (Y ,Y ) corr   0.78  0.78  0.78  0.78  0.78 
**
i (Y ,Y ) corr   0.56 0.71  0.62  0.68  0.64 
i (Y ,Y) corr   0.66 0.86  0.88  0.63  0.76 
 
The table follows the same format as Table 1A, replacing the standard deviation of the production-worker 
industry wage bill with that for production worker employment.    34
Table 2: Size of Outsourcing Industries in Mexico and the U.S. 
 
    Thousands of employees (mean 2000-2005) 
NAICS  Industry  Mexico   US  Texas   California  
 All  maquiladoras  (Mex.)  1,151.00  --  --  -- 
          
  All manufacturing (U.S.)  --  15,336.70  955.5  1,649.00 
          
315 Apparel  230.8  356.9  --  97.4 
          
334 Electronic  materials  265.6  1,512.30  132.9  366.6 
          
335 Electrical  machinery  100.2  497.5  20.0  38.5 
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Table 3: Relative Volatility in Mexico and U.S. Outsourcing Industries: 





Machinery  Electronics 
Transport 
Equipment  Average 
 National  Level 
*
i (Y ) σ  (Mex. Outsourcing Industry)  4.48 4.11 5.50 2.73 4.21 
i (Y ) σ  (U.S. Outsourcing Industry)  1.63 1.52 2.47 1.07 1.67 
* (Y ) σ  (Mex. Aggregate Manufacturing)  0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 
(Y) σ  (U.S. Aggregate Manufacturing)  1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 
*
ii (Y )/ (Y ) σσ   2.75 2.70 2.23 2.55 2.56 








  3.61 3.55 2.92 3.35 3.35 
 California 
*
i (Y ) σ  (Mex. Outsourcing Industry)  4.48 4.11 5.50 2.73 4.21 
i (Y ) σ  (U.S. Outsourcing Industry)  2.25 2.35 2.62 1.31 2.13 
* (Y ) σ  (Mex. Aggregate Manufacturing)  0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 
(Y) σ  (U.S. Aggregate Manufacturing)  1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 
*
ii (Y )/ (Y ) σσ   1.99 1.75 2.10 2.08 1.98 








  3.62 3.18 3.82 3.79 3.60 
 Texas 
*
i (Y ) σ  (Mex. Outsourcing Industry)  4.48 4.11 5.50 2.73 3.09 
i (Y ) σ  (U.S. Outsourcing Industry)  --  2.48 3.12 1.66 2.42 
* (Y ) σ  (Mex. Aggregate Manufacturing)  0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 
(Y) σ  (U.S. Aggregate Manufacturing)  1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 
*
ii (Y )/ (Y ) σσ   --  1.66 1.76 1.64 1.69 








  --  2.50 2.66 2.48 2.54 
 
The table follows the same format as Table 1A, replacing the standard deviation of the production-worker 
industry wage bill with that for total employment.    36
Table 4A:  Difference-in-Differences for Variation in Mexico and U.S. Outsourcing Industries 
Production Worker Wage Bill 
 
 
   Electrical    Transport 
   Apparel  Machinery  Electronics  Equipment 
Constant  0.161 0.161  0.161  0.161 
 (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.021) 
        
Outsourcing Industry  0.370 0.240  0.613  0.526 
 (0.126)  (0.049)  (0.105)  (0.201) 
        
Mexico  0.211 0.211  0.211  0.211 
 (0.046)  (0.045)  (0.047)  (0.045) 
        
Outsourcing*Mexico  1.574 1.315  2.841  0.852 
 (0.294)  (0.232)  (0.475)  (0.319) 
        
R Squared  0.224  0.246  0.234  0.110 
        
 
Each column shows results for a regression of the squared deviation from the mean of the production-
worker wage bill (times 1000) for a sample that includes a Mexico maquiladora industry, the 
corresponding U.S. industry, aggregate Mexican manufacturing, and aggregate U.S. manufacturing, over 
the period 1996:1-2005:12.  Regressors include a constant, a dummy for whether observations pertain to 
an outsourcing industry (as opposed to aggregate manufacturing), a dummy for whether observations 
pertain to Mexico (as opposed to the United States), and the interaction of the outsourcing-industry and 
Mexico dummies.  Standard errors are obtained through bootstrapping, using 1000 repetitions.    37
 
Table 4B:  Difference-in-Differences for Variation in Mexico and U.S. Outsourcing Industries 
U.S. State Level Total Employment 
 
    Electrical  Transport 
    Apparel Machinery Electronics Equipment 
        
 National  Level 
Constant  0.101 0.101  0.101  0.101 
 (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.013) 
Outsourcing Industry  0.161 0.127  0.505  0.013 
 (0.034)  (0.035)  (0.096)  (0.030) 
Mexico  -0.043 -0.043  -0.043  -0.043 
 (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
Outsourcing*Mexico  1.767 1.492  2.441  0.668 
 (0.237)  (0.205)  (0.505)  (0.150) 
R Squared  0.282  0.261  0.164  0.108 
        
 California 
Constant  0.195 0.195  0.195  0.195 
 (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.032) 
Outsourcing Industry  0.307 0.353  0.484  -0.024 
 (0.075)  (0.098)  (0.110)  (0.041) 
Mexico  -0.137 -0.137  -0.137  -0.137 
 (0.032)  (0.033)  (0.032)  (0.033) 
Outsourcing*Mexico  1.620 1.266  2.462  0.705 
 (0.239)  (0.220)  (0.495)  (0.152) 
R Squared  0.249  0.209  0.158  0.093 
        
 Texas 
Constant   0.134  0.134  0.134 
  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.015) 
Outsourcing Industry   0.474  0.832  0.141 
  (0.090)  (0.120)  (0.053) 
Mexico   -0.075  -0.075  -0.075 
  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.017) 
Outsourcing*Mexico   1.145  2.113  0.540 
  (0.226)  (0.504)  (0.155) 
R Squared    0.219  0.157  0.090 
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Each column shows results for a regression of the squared deviation from the mean of total employment 
(times 1000) for a sample that includes a Mexico maquiladora industry, the corresponding U.S. industry, 
aggregate Mexican manufacturing, and aggregate U.S. manufacturing, over the period 1996:1-2005:12.  
Regressors include a constant, a dummy for whether observations pertain to an outsourcing industry (as 
opposed to aggregate manufacturing), a dummy for whether observations pertain to Mexico (as opposed 
to the United States), and the interaction of the outsourcing-industry and Mexico dummies.  Standard 
errors are obtained through bootstrapping, using 1000 repetitions.    39




σ   elasticity between varieties  6 
χ   elasticity between outsourcing and   2 
 non-outsourcing  goods 
η   elasticity between home and foreign   1 
 goods   
θ   home bias in U.S.  0.88 
* θ   home bias in Mexico  0.71 
α  outsourcing  share  0.24 
μ   labor supply elasticity  1 
φ  risk  aversion  2 
n  relative size of US  0.74 
ϖ   relative wealth of Mexico  1/37 
H G   US mean government demand  0.1651 





H a   US steady state unit cost  1 
F a   Mexican steady state unit cost  4.03 
B  fixed cost    0.0087 
z  share  of  outsourcing  0.20 
a   US outsourcing slope parameter  -0.964 
t b   US outsourcing level parameter  0.1928 
d a   relative cost slope parameter  -0.964 
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Table 6 .  Model Simulation 
Benchmark Case 
 














shock    data 
Standard deviations:             
   σ (Y*os)  4.08 2.71  1.87  0.19  2.30    4.91 
   σ (Yos)  2.29 1.55  0.62  0.48  1.40    2.44 
   σ (Y*)  2.01 1.65  0.31  0.11  1.13    1.94 
   σ (Y)  1.77 1.64  0.31  0.36  0.39    1.27 
   σ (Y*os)/ σ (Yos)  1.78 1.75  3.04  0.40  1.64    2.03 
   σ (Y*)/ σ (Y)  1.14 1.01  1.01  0.31  2.94    1.53 
 
 
1.58 1.74  3.00  1.28  0.56    1.33 
Correlations                  
  
*
OS OS (Y ,Y ) corr   0.77 0.98  -0.77  0.90  1.00    0.36 
  
* (Y ,Y ) corr   0.91 1.00  1.00  0.91  1.00    0.24 
  
**
OS (Y ,Y ) corr   0.87 0.99  -0.14  0.99  1.00    0.36 
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Table 7 .  Model Simulation 
Sensitivity to alternative calibration of A’(z) 
 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)   (5) 
-0.001 -0.1  -1  -2    data 
Standard deviations:           
   σ (Y*os)  4.08 3.57 3.08  3.02    4.91 
   σ (Yos)  2.29 2.30 2.36  2.38    2.44 
   σ (Y*)  2.01 1.94 1.91  1.92    1.94 
   σ (Y)  1.77 1.78 1.80  1.82    1.27 
   σ (Y*os)/ σ (Yos)  1.78 1.56 1.31  1.27      2.03 
   σ (Y*)/ σ (Y)  1.14 1.10 1.06  1.06    1.53 
 
 
1.58 1.42 1.23  1.20    1.33 
Correlations            
  
*
OS OS (Y ,Y ) corr   0.77 0.88 0.97  0.97    0.36 
  
* (Y ,Y ) corr   0.91 0.90 0.87  0.88    0.24 
  
**
OS (Y ,Y ) corr   0.87 0.89 0.93  0.94    0.36 
   OS (Y ,Y) corr   0.85 0.87 0.89  0.90    0.62 
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Table 8 .  Model Simulation 
Alternative Versions of the Model 
               
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)   (7) 
firm entry:  translog  translog CES  CES  no entry  no entry   data 
endogenous  outsourcing: yes No  yes no yes no     
Standard deviations:               
   σ (Y*os)  4.08 3.01  4.05 2.72 3.84 2.77    4.91 
   σ (Yos)  2.29 2.37  2.04 2.16 1.79 2.06    2.44 
   σ (Y*)  2.01 1.89  1.97 1.84 1.92 1.83    1.94 
   σ (Y)  1.77 1.80  1.71 1.77 1.66 1.74    1.27 
   σ (Y*os)/ σ (Yos)  1.78 1.27  1.99 1.26 2.15 1.35    2.03 
   σ (Y*)/ σ (Y)  1.14 1.05  1.15 1.04 1.16 1.05    1.53 
 
 
1.58 1.21  1.73 1.22 1.86 1.29    1.33 
Correlations                
  
*
OS OS (Y ,Y ) corr   0.77 0.97  0.70 0.97 0.65 0.96    0.36 
  
* (Y ,Y ) corr   0.91 0.85  0.91 0.84 0.90 0.84    0.24 
  
**
OS (Y ,Y ) corr   0.87 0.94  0.85 0.93 0.83 0.92    0.36 
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Figure 1:  Industry Shares of Maquiladora Employment in Mexico 
 
Year
 Apparel  Electronic Materials
 Electric Machinery  Transport Equipment
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Figure 3:  Wage Bill for Production Workers in Mexico and U.S. Outsourcing Industries 
(log real values, seasonally adjusted and HP filtered) 
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